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III. NO DEFERENCE IS DUE THE WORKFORCE APPEALS BOARD'S 
ARBITRARY AND ERRONEOUS FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS 
REGARDING THE LEGAL RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN MS. 
ELLIOT AND PETRO-HUNT. 
The Workforce Appeals Board based its Answering Brief on a misstatement 
of the pertinent standard of review for the matter now before the Court. The Board 
has erroneously submitted that, as long as its decision was "reasonable and 
rational," this Court should affirm its findings and conclusions. Resp. Br. at 2. 
Utah law on this point, however, is clear. This Court is not required to give 
deference to the Workforce Appeals Board's because its erroneous findings and 
conclusions regarding the issues presented by the within appeal, including: (1) 
Whether Petro-Hunt was denied fundamental due process and the ability to prepare 
and conduct a defense when the Administrative Law Judge refused to allow it to 
conduct any discovery; (2) Whether the Workforce Appeals Board erred as a 
matter of law when it concluded that Ms. Elliot was an "employee" of Petro-Hunt; 
and (3) Whether the Workforce Appeals Board erred as a matter of law when it 
rejected well-established industry practice and ignored principles of Utah law on 
how the industry engages, establishes and characterizes the work of an independent 
landmen. 
/// 
/ / / 
/ / / 
4. 
A. No Deference Due Administrative Law Judge's Arbitrary Refusal 
To Allow Petro-Hunt To Conduct Discovery. 
Whether the agency's interpretation of a statute is incorrect or 
unconstitutional, are questions of law that are reviewed under a correction of error 
standard with no deference to the expertise of the administrative tribunal. See 
Esquivel v. Labor Comm'n, UT 66, 13-19, 7 P.3d 777 (2000), 
In this case, the Workforce Appeals Board has asserted that there is no 
specific due process right to discovery. Resp. Br. at 21. However, the Workforce 
Appeals Board has ignored well established Utah precedent providing that litigants 
in an administrative proceeding have a right to a fair trial, which necessarily 
includes that right of litigants to conduct discovery in preparation of a proper 
defense. Bunnell v. Industrial Comm'n of Utah, 740 P.2d 1331, 1333 (Utah 1987); 
Nelson v. Department of Employment Sec, 801 P.2d 158 (Utah App.,1990); 
Ellison, Inc. v. Board of Review, 749 P.2d 1280, 1285 (Utah Ct.App.1988) 
(litigants in an administrative hearing have a "due process right to receive a fair 
trial."); Anderson v. Industrial Commission, 696 P.2d 1219, 1221 (Utah 1985)(A 
fair trial requires not only an absence of actual bias, but requires tribunals to avoid 
even the possibility of unfairness); see also Bunnell v. Industrial Com'n of Utah, 
740 P.2d 1331 (Utah,1987). 
This due process right to discovery in the appeal of unemployment 
determinations has been further codified in the Utah Administrative Code. 
5. 
Specifically, Utah Administrative Code Section R994-508-108 provides that an 
administrative law judge may compel discovery where informal means of 
discovery have been insufficient. Moreover, the Code states that all discovery 
processes established in the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure may be utilized. UAC § 
R994-508-108(3). 
At the administrative hearing below, Petro-Hunt submitted in its motion for 
discovery to the ALJ that it had attempted informal discovery, but informal 
discovery was ultimately inadequate to allow discovery into whether Ms. Elliot 
had engaged or continues to engage in an independently established trade and 
occupation as a broker of oil, gas and mineral leases. ROA at 71-94. The ALJ did 
not make any specific findings or conclusions with regard to whether Petro-Hunt9s 
efforts to conduct informal discovery were inadequate under Utah Administrative 
Code Section R994-508-108. Rather, the ALJ arbitrarily denied Petro-Hunt's 
request for formal discovery. This blatant denial of due process prevented Petro-
Hunt from discovering and presenting evidence that was necessary to its 
preparation of a complete defense. In this regard, Petro-Hunt was prevented from 
presenting dispositive evidence that Ms. Elliot was an independent landman who 
was engaged by companies in the oil and gas industry as an independent 
contractor. 
/// 
6. 
B. No Deference Due Workforce Appeals Board Erroneous Legal 
Conclusion That Ms. Elliot Was An "Employee" Of Petro-Hunt. 
Utah appellate courts do not give deference to Workforce Appeals Board's 
construction and application of law in unemployment casek unless the statutory 
language being applied and construed evinces the Legislature's specific intent to 
commit such broad discretion to the administrative agency because of the agency's 
expertise in given area. Trotta v. Department of Employment Sec, 664 P.2d 1195 
(1983). Contrary to the Workforce Appeals Board's position, Utah case law 
provides that proper application of the Employment Security Act and the relevant 
regulations adopted thereunder do not require specialized or technical knowledge 
that would be uniquely within the Workforce Appeals Board's expertise; therefore, 
the Court of Appeals is not required to give the agency's decision deference. See 
Ekshteyn v. Department of Workforce Services, 45 P.3d 173, 443 Utah Adv. Rep. 
20 (2002); Autoliv ASP, Inc. v. Department of Workforce Services, 29 P.3d 7, 424 
Utah Adv. Rep. 18 (2001); SOS Staffing Services, Inc. v. Workforce Appeals Bd., 
983 P.2d 581, 372 Utah Adv. Rep. 23 (1999) 
Here, the Workforce Appeals Board has baldly asserted that there is a 
default rule presuming that all landmen are employees of those that pay them 
absent evidence proving otherwise to the tribunal's own "satisfaction." Resp. Br. 
at 19. However, there is no default rule in Utah holding that a "landmen" is an 
independent contractor. That is to say, Utah law does not automatically classify all 
7, 
"landmen" to be employees as the Workforce Appeals Board contends. Indeed, no 
Utah case or statute specifically addresses whether "landmen" are independent 
contractors or employees under the Utah Unemployment Security Act. 
Under Utah law, when a statute or regulation is silent on a matter, common 
law or other state law addressing the same issue can be persuasive authority, 
especially where the law of the sister state is substantially similar to the law being 
construed in the forum state. See Arndt v. First Interstate Bank of Utah, 378 Utah 
Adv. Rep. 22, 1999 UT 91, f 17, 991 P.2d 584, 589 ("When Utah law is not fully 
developed on an issue, Utah courts look to "the case law from other jurisdictions 
for guidance."); State v. Montiel 531 Utah Adv. Rep. 10, 2005 UT 48, 122 P.3d 
571 (2005). 
In this case, the Workforce Appeals Board failed to recognize and address 
the similarities between Utah law and Texas law when it summarily disregarded 
the fact that Texas law recognizes that landmen are independent contractors not 
employees. Importantly, Texas and Utah apply the same test for determining 
whether an individual is an independent contractor. Compare Utah Code § 35A-4-
204(3) and Utah Admin Code § R994-204-303 (Factors for Determining 
Independent Contractor Status) to Schievink v. Wendylou Ranch, Inc., 227 S.W.3d 
862 (Tex.App.-Eastland, 2007) (citing Indus. Indem. Exch. v. Southard, 138 Tex. 
531, 160 S.W.2d 905, 907 (1942)(An independent contractor has been defined as 
8. 
"any person who, in the pursuit of an independent business, undertakes to do a 
specific piece of work for other persons, using his own means and methods, 
without submitting himself to their control in respect to all its details.") and Tex. 
A & M Univ. v. Bishop, 156 S.W.3d 580, 584-85 (Tex.2005) (citing Indus. Indem. 
Exch., 160 S.W.2d at 906) (the factors used to determine whether or not a worker 
is an independent contractor under Texas law are: (1) the independent nature of his 
business; (2) his obligation to furnish necessary tools, supplies, and material to 
perform the job; (3) his right to control the progress of the work, except as to final 
results; (4) the time for which he is employed; and (5) the method of payment, 
whether by time or by the job.) 
There are important policy reasons why Utah, absent specific direction from 
the State Legislature, should follow the Texas example and hold that independent 
landmen, such as Ms. Elliot, should be deemed independent contractors rather than 
employees. Most importantly, throughout the oil and gas industry, independent 
landmen are consistently recognized and treated as independent contractors by 
their clients. ROA at 150; 224-227. Indeed, according to the American 
Association of Professional Landmen ("AAPL"), the voluntary trade organization 
associated with this profession, independent landmen such as Ms. Elliot are "self-
employed" and "serve clients on a contract basis". ROA at 150; 224-225, 
Independent landmen have specialized knowledge and skills which are unique to 
9. 
their profession, including researching courthouse and abstract office records to 
determine the ownership of oil, gas and mineral rights, preparing specialized 
reports, and procuring leases for their clients. ROA at 112; 143; 147. Moreover, 
independent landmen are retained on a project-basis to assist their clients with their 
energy exploration and development efforts. See id. Because the nature of the 
business involves short-term projects, it would be impracticable to require energy 
companies to hire independent landmen as long-term employees when their 
services will no longer be needed after a particular project ends. 
Hence, it is clear that landmen, whether in Utah or Texas, are generally 
engaged in a trade recognized by the industry as independent. Excluding landmen 
from coverage under Utah's Employment Security Act makes sense because of the 
unique nature of the services they render and the business realities of the oil and 
gas industry. In this regard, Utah Courts have consistently recognized the nature 
and realities of businesses who engage shoe shiners, auto mechanics, plumbers, 
barbers and siding installers to conclude that individuals engaged in these 
independently established trades were not employees of the companies they 
contracted with.1 North Am. Builders, Inc., v. Unemployment Compensation 
1
 In the Fuller Brush case, the Utah Supreme Court explained: 
A takes to the blacksmith a horse to be shod and a plow point to be 
sharpened. The smith renders personal service and receives remuneration for 
his time and labor, which constitutes wages under the act. But it was not 
contemplated that A should pay contributions on the money paid the 
ETacksmith, nor that the smith should be eligible for benefit 
10, 
Divisions, Dept., 22 Utah 2d 338, 341-342, 453 P. 2d 142, 144-145 (1969)(citing 
Leach v. Board of Review, 123 Utah 423, 260 P.2d 744 (195ft). 
The Workforce Appeals Board has completely disregarded the sensible 
approach taken by the Utah Supreme Court and, in so doing, has erroneously 
concluded that Ms. Elliot was an employee of Petro-Hunt. Indeed, a review of the 
Workforce Appeals Board's position has evolved from the field investigator's 
finding that Ms. Elliot was an "office manager" for Petro-Hunt to an admission 
that Ms. Elliot "generally performed work that fit within the duties" of an 
independent landman. Resp. Br. at 5, 6. By characterizing Ms. Elliot as an 
employee, the Workforce Appeals Board has erred as a matter of law by deviating 
from well-established industry practice and related principles of Utah law. 
/ / / 
compensations under the act as now written. The blacksmith performs his 
task of shoeing the horse and sharpening the plow point according to his 
own methods and ideas without direction or control from A, who may leave 
the shop while the work is done, relying and depending upon the smith's 
superior knowledge and ability. The work is done away from all places of 
business of A,— and the smith is customarily engaged m an independently 
established trade, to wit, blacksmithing. Other illustrations are the shoe 
shiner; the auto-mechanic who repairs or overhauls a car; the dentist; the 
butcher who cuts up the deer the hunter brings in; the plumber who cleans 
out the drains and perhaps replaces parts of the plumbing; the C. P. A. who 
comes in and audits the books; ana the barber who cuts the hair, gives a 
shave, massage and shampoo; and the surgeon performing an operation on 
the patient. In these simple illustrations, such people all render personal 
service for a remuneration, but they are free from control in ttie doing 
oTthe service, that is, they are their own bosses as to how they do it; 
tEev perform services outside the employer's place of business, or 
outside the usual course of his business, and they are all customarily 
engaged in an independently established trade, business or profession. 
Fuller Brush Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 99 Utah 97 (Utah 1940Xemphasis 
supplied.^ 
11. 
C. No Deference Is Due The Work Force Appeals Board's Arbitrary 
Factual Findings Because The Findings, When Analyzed Under 
Utah Code Ann. § 35A-4-204(3)(a), Do Not Support The Legal 
Conclusion Of The Tribunal. 
Moreover, under UAPA, an agency's factual findings will be affirmed "only 
if they are 'supported by substantial evidence when viewed in light of the whole 
record before the court.' " Grace Drilling Co. v. Board of Review, 776 P.2d 63, 67 
(Utah App.1989) (quoting Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-16(4)(g) (1988)). See 
Department of the Air Force v. Swider, 824 P.2d 448, 451 (Utah App.1991). 
Substantial evidence is "more than a mere 'scintilla' of evidence ... though 
'something less than the weight of the evidence." Id. "Substantial evidence is 
'such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a 
conclusion." Id. Whole record review under the substantial evidence test 
considers the evidence in support of the administrative finding, as well as evidence 
that detracts from the finding. Martinez v. Media-Paymaster Plus/Church of Jesus 
Christ of Latter-Day Saints, 578 Utah Adv. Rep. 20, 164 P.3d 384 (2007). 
When, as in this appeal, there are mixed questions of law and fact, the 
reviewing court must engage in a two step analysis when applying the substantial 
evidence standard set forth in the Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-16(4)(g) (1989). See 
id. at 392. First, identify the law which governs the contested issue, as such law 
establishes what facts had to be proven, and how such facts had to be proven. See 
id.; see also State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 935-37 (Utah 1994); Pullman-Standard v. 
12. 
Swint 456 U.S. 273, 290 n. 19, 102 S.Ct. 1781, 72 L.Ed.2d 66 (1982) (defining a 
mixed question of law and fact as occurring when "historical facts are admitted or 
established, the rule of law is undisputed, and the issue is whether the facts satisfy 
the statutory standard, or ... whether the rule of law as applied to the established 
facts is or is not violated"); Drake v. Industrial Commission, 939 P.2d 177 (Utah 
1997)(facts must be analyzed under legal rule and support the conclusion of the 
tribunal). Second, review the record on appeal and determine whether the record 
contains both that quantity and quality of factual evidence which a reasonable man 
could accept as adequate proof of what the governing law requires. First National 
Bank of Boston v. County Board of Equalization, 799 P.2d 1163 (Utah 1990). If 
the record on appeal does not contain both that quantity and quality of factual 
evidence which a reasonable man could accept as adequate proof of what the 
governing law requires, then the decision of the administrative agency may be 
deemed by the Court to be clearly erroneous in view of the reliable, probative and 
substantial evidence on the whole record, or arbitrary, capricious or characterized 
by abuse of discretion. Id.; see also Swider, 824 P.2d at 451; Grace Drilling, 776 
P.2d at 68. 
1. Summary Of The Governing Law 
In this case, the Utah Code requires an individual to satisfy two tests in order 
to be classified as an independent contractor and be exempted from the state 
13. 
unemployment statue. First, the individual must be "customarily engaged in an 
independently established trade, occupation, profession, or business of the same 
nature as that involved in the contract of hire for services." Utah Code Ann. § 
35A-4-204(3)(a). Second, the individual must be "free from the control or 
direction over the means of performance of those services." Utah Code Ann. § 
35A-4-204(3)(b). 
The Utah Administrative Code sets forth a number of factors that are 
relevant to determining whether an individual is an employee or an independent 
contractor. See Utah Admin Code § R994-204-303. Applying the foregoing 
governing authority to the quality and quantity of evidence presented to the 
Workforce Appeals Board, this Court should reverse the Workforce Appeals 
Boards erroneous determination that Ms. Elliot was an employee of Petro-Hunt. 
2. Quality and Quantity Of The Evidence Does Not Support 
Legal Conclusion Of The Administrative Law Judge And 
The Workforce Appeals Board That Ms. Elliot Was An 
Employee Of Petro-Hunt. 
The decision of the Workforce Appeals Board and Administrative Law 
Judge unduly relies solely on the testimony of Ms. Elliot. Without 
corroborating evidence to support the testimony relied upon, the quality of 
testimonial evidence of Ms. Elliot is dubious. In this regard, the Administrative 
Law Judge was not provided with a complete cross-examination of Ms. Elliot 
because the Administrative Law Judge refused to allow Petro-Hunt to conduct 
14. 
discovery and present facts contradictory to the self-serving testimony of Ms. 
Elliot. For example, Petro-Hunt was prevented from cross-examining Ms. 
Elliot regarding her representations about the amount and sources of her 
income. Specifically, Petro-Hunt was denied the opportunity to obtain copies 
of Ms. Elliot's 1099 forms and tax returns and, thus, had no way to challenge 
the testimony of Ms. Elliot. Moreover, these documents would have been 
highly relevant to Petro-Hunt's examination of Ms. Elliot regarding whether she 
held herself out as an independent contractor, whether she had been treated by 
the industry in general as an independent contractor, and whether she had the 
opportunity for profit or loss as an independent broker. 
The only other evidence considered by the Administrative Law Judge, 
besides Ms. Elliot's testimony, was the DSW's evidence supporting its 
conclusion that Ms. Eliot was an "office secretary and office manager for Petro-
Hunt," ROA at 1-3. However, this conclusion was conceded by all parties to 
be false. Contrary to the field auditor's finding, the evidence presented 
established that Ms. Elliot was never an "office manager" or "secretary" for 
Petro-Hunt. ROA at 125; 218-219; 222; 226-227. Rather, the evidence 
established that, as an independent landman, Ms. Elliot was commissioned to 
perform due diligence on the leases acquired through the Trifecta Project, 
I 
primarily the Paradise Leases. ROA at 125; 142-144; 149-151; 218-219; 222; 
15. 
226-227, Ms. Elliot reviewed lease title documents and records; and, using her 
own computer and software, prepared specialized reports, updated lease 
spreadsheets and organized lease and ownership summaries. ROA at 112; 218-
219. 
Moreover, the evidence relied upon by the Administrative Law Judge 
and the Workforce Appeals Board supporting its findings on the factors for 
determining whether an individual is an employee or an independent contractor 
is insufficient. 
For example, regarding the second factor for determining whether an 
individual is an employee or an independent contractor, the undisputed 
evidence established that Ms. Elliot had a substantial investment in her tools 
and equipment. ROA at 218-219; 222. To fulfill her duties as a contractor for 
Petro-Hunt, Ms. Elliot was required to provide her own computer and software, 
which were the primary tools used by Ms. Elliot in connection with her work. 
ROA at 218-219; 221-222; 226-227. Ms. Elliot also used her own personal e-
mail account to communicate with the company. Id. Nonetheless, the 
Workforce Appeals Board arbitrarily refused to recognize that the second factor 
weighed heavily in favor of independent contractor status. 
Additionally, when deciding that the third factor favored employee 
status, the Workforce Appeals Board selectively emphasized the perceived 
16. 
constraints of a broker agreement between Ms. Elliot and Petro-Hunt. 
However, the evidence presented to the Workforce Appeals Board showed that 
Ms. Elliot regularly performed landman services for other clients besides Petro-
Hunt. In this regard, Ms. Elliot admitted to performing landman services for 
three other brokerage companies, including Hingeline Land and Title, Bowman 
and Associates, and Baseline. ROA at 120-122, 218-219; 222-223. Moreover, 
the evidence presented to the Workforce Appeals Board established that, while 
contracting with Petro-Hunt, Ms. Elliot was not required to work full time and 
was permitted to work as much or as little as she wished. ROA at 220; 222-
223. Based on the evidence presented, the Workforce Appeals Board should 
have concluded that the third factor favored independent contractor status, not 
employee status. 
Addressing the fourth factor as favoring employee status, the Workforce 
Appeals Board ignored evidence of how Ms. Elliot was paid and the underlying 
legal arrangement between Petro-Hunt and Ms. Elliot. In this regard, the 
evidence presented showed that Ms. Elliot presented invoices to Petro-Hunt 
which were paid upon receipt. ROA at 219. Ms. Elliot was in a position to 
realize a profit or loss from her fee for services because she controlled her costs, 
could hire helpers and could take on additional work. ROA at 219-220; 222-
223. 
17. 
In summary, the quantity and quality of the evidence considered by the 
Workforce Appeals Board simply does not support the legal conclusion that 
Ms. Elliot was an "employee" of Petro-Hunt. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
In accordance with the foregoing, Petro-Hunt respectfully requests that the 
Court of Appeals reverse the Workforce Appeals Board's December 3, 2007 
Decision and hold that Ms. Elliot was an independent contractor. In the 
alternative, the Court should remand this matter for proceeding consistent with the 
Petro-Hunt's rights and privileges accorded by the Employment Security Act, the 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and the U.S. and Utah Constitutions and be 
permitted to prepare and present a complete defense. 
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